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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
poration's 'being admitted to do business in the state'; that the
amount thereof is determined by the capital employed in the
state, but is not to exceed $2,500; and that the required payments
on increases of capital stock were merely to prevent a corpora-
tion from entering with the minimum tax of $10 and thereafter




Payment of a negotiable instrument in due course by or on
behalf of the principal debtor is one of the means expressly enu-
merated in the negotiable instruments law of discharging the
instrument.' Under the statute payment is made in "due course"
when it is made "at or after maturity of the instrument to the
holder thereof in good faith and without notice that his title is
defective."'2 A payment before maturity to one not the "holder"
does not discharge the instrument. Payment even after maturity
to one not the holder is at the risk of the party making the pay-
ment.3 In: the application of these principles it is clear that the
burden of proof rests upon the party who pleads the defense of
payment to show by a preponderance of the evidence that pay-
ment of the instrument claimed to be discharged has been made
to one authorized to receive payment on behalf of the holder.4 It
is not incumbent upon the holder who sues on a note to prove
non-payment.
Egert v. Stassi5 was a case merely involving issues of fact in
the application of these principles. Plaintiff sued as the trans-
feree-holder of a note for $5,000.00 executed by defendant pay-
able to a corporation. Defendant pleaded payment on the day be-
fore maturity by a check payable to a New Orleans bank. Plain-
tiff denied that such payment was in satisfaction of the note or
that it had any connection with defendant's personal indebted-
1. La. R.S. 7:119(1) (1950).
2. La. R.S. 7:88 (1950).
3. See, for example, Henry Knight & Son, Inc. v. Shall, 9 La. App. 98, 119
So. 80 (1928) applying the well-settled rule that a person paying one not in
:possession of the note and without requiring its delivery up for cancellation acts
at his peril unless the person receiving payment has authority from the holder or
owner as his agent to receive payment thereof. Numerous cases applying these
principles are collected in BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (Beutel's
rev. 7th ed. 1948).
4. Orleans Discount Co. v. Derbes, 170 La. 660, 129 So. 121 (1930).
5. 237 La. .1070, 112 So.2d 715 (1959).
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ness on the note in suit.
The defendant proved that a check for $5004.86 had in fact
been issued to the New Orleans bank but only the defendant's
testimony supported the claim that such remittance was for the
note in suit. The bank's records were not subpoenaed and there
was no other corroborating evidence. The plaintiff's testimony
was flatly to the effect that the check was in payment of another
obligation. Under these circumstances the court affirmed a
judgment for the plaintiff holding that the defendant had not
met the burden of proving that the item sued on had been paid.
The result reached is unquestionably a correct application, of
principles applicable to the payment of negotiable instruments
under the facts as found by the court
The close character of factual determinations which must be
made in passing upon the plea of payment is well illustrated in
White v. Johness,6 also decided during the last term. Plaintiffs
sought recovery of a balance of $23,000.00 plus interest and at-
torneys fees on a note acquired by inheritance from their father.
The issue involved was whether the note had been discharged by
a transfer of stock to the holder or whether such stock transfer
was a pledge of the stock to secure the balance of the note. The
maker's letter to the holder had expre-.sly stated that the stock
was to be delivered "in liquidation of this indebtedness" and con-
cluded by referring to an option to redeem the stock within two
years at $200.00. Ambiguity as to the nature of the transaction
was interjected by the holder's letter wherein he referred to the
redemptive right and stated he would treat the stock "the same
as though it were given to me as collateral to the note in ques-
tion." Additional memoranda further clouded the exact factual
intention of the parties. The Supreme Court upon a review of
the evidence concluded that the holder had considered himself
the owner of the stock, that it was intended as a payment, and
that the right to redeem the stock could not, on the facts, be
viewed as establishing only a pledge of the stock. In the court's
view, the preponderance of the evidence as well as the logical
deductions from the documentary evidence were sufficient to
sustain the trial court's conclusion that defendant had in fact
paid the note. Reliance was placed on the defendant's testimony,
but it is to be noted that the testimony had a completely adequate
corroboration from the documents that were in evidence.
6. 237 La. 1074, 112 So.2d 717 (1959).
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